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David A. Wise
This is the eighth in a series of volumes on the economics of aging. The
previous volumes were The Economics of Aging, Issues in the Economics of
Aging, Topics in the Economics of Aging, Studies in the Economics of Aging,
Advances in the Economics of Aging, Inquiries in the Economics of Aging,
and Frontiers in the Economics of Aging. Thep apers in this volume discuss
important implications of private and (potential) public personal retire-
ment plans, discuss aspects of the health and wealth relationship, consider
several aspects of health care in the United States, analyze the retirement
eﬀects of social security provisions in the United States and Germany, and
consider new evidence on bequests and dissaving at older ages. The papers
are summarized in this introduction, which draws heavily on the authors’
own summaries.
Personal Retirement Plans
Threepapers direct attention to personal retirement plans. The ﬁrst con-
siders private 401(k) plans and the accumulation of retirement assets. The
second paper considers the implications of personal retirement saving
plans as part of a possible Social Security reform. The third considers
annuitization, which will become increasingly important with the rapid
expansion of private personal retirement saving plans.
David A. Wise is the John F. Stambaugh Professor of Political Economy at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the director of health and retire-
ment programs at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1Private Personal Accounts: Preretirement Cashouts and 401(k) Assets
About half of U.S. families are now eligible for a 401(k) plan, and the
use of these plans is spreading rapidly. In the previous volume of this se-
ries,J ames Poterba, Steven Venti, and I considered the “Implications of
Rising Personal Retirement Saving.” We concluded that the cohorts that
reach age sixty-ﬁve between 2024 and 2034 will have 401(k) assets that
greatly exceed the personal ﬁnancial assets of current retirees, and that
these assets are likely to exceed their Social Security assets, perhaps by a
great deal. In this volume we consider “Preretirement Cashouts and Fore-
gone Retirement Saving: Implications for 401(k) Asset Accumulation.” Al-
though many analysts have emphasized the prevalence of cashouts and
their presumed eﬀect on the accumulation of retirement assets, we ﬁnd
that the importance of cashouts has been greatly exaggerated and that, in
fact, cashouts have only a minor eﬀect onr e t irement asset accumulation.
Thew ay households support themselves in retirement is changing rap-
idly. Historically, households in the United States have relied on a combi-
nation of Social Security, employer-provided deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, and
personal saving to support their retirement years. In the last ﬁfteen years,
however, retirement saving programs such as 401(k) plans have become an
increasingly common component of household retirement planning. To-
day, more than 35 million workers participate in 401(k) saving plans, and
the annual contribution ﬂow to these plans exceeds $100 billion. The tax-
deferred nature of wealth accumulation in 401(k)-type plans, coupled with
often generous employer matching contributions that enhance the value of
employee contributions, make these plans a powerful vehicle for accumu-
lating retirement wealth.
In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (PVW) (1998a), we showed that even with
conservative assumptions about the future growth of 401(k) contributions,
the average 401(k) balance for households reaching retirement between
2024 and 2034 would likelye xceed average actuarial present value of So-
cial Security beneﬁts.
Although 401(k) plan accumulations are likely to account for a very
substantial share of the net worth of future retirees, unlike Social Security
beneﬁts, they can be aﬀected by a number of individual decisions. Individ-
uals who work at ﬁrms that oﬀer 401(k) plans must decide whether to
participate in their employers’ plans. Those who do not participate forego
the opportunity to accumulate retirement wealth in this tax-deferred form.
Conditional on participating, individuals must decide how much of their
earnings to contribute to these plans. In particular, participants who leave
their jobs can also choose to leave their 401(k) accumulations in their
former employers’ plans, or to roll over their assets either into an individ-
ual retirement arrangement (IRA) or into the 401(k) plan of a new em-
ployer. The ﬂexibility aﬀorded by these three options enhances the porta-
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beneﬁt pension plans, of forfeiting pension beneﬁts as a result of job
change. However, the ﬂexibility associated with the 401(k) withdrawal op-
tion raises the possibility that 401(k) participants may draw down their
account balances before retirement, and thereby reach retirement without
assets in a 401(k) account.
An umber of recent studies have noted that conditional on choosing to
withdraw assets from the 401(k) system—i.e., conditional on receiving a
“lump-sum distribution”—many individuals use their withdrawals in ways
that do not preserve retirement saving. In PVW (1998b) we showed, how-
ever, that older workers, and those who receive larger lump-sum distribu-
tions, are much more likely to preserve the retirement beneﬁts of their
lump-sum distributions through IRA rollovers or other forms of saving.
In the current paper, we use data on past 401(k) participation rates
by agea nd income decile, along with information on average 401(k) con-
tribution rates, to project the future 401(k) contribution trajectories of
households that are currently headed by individuals between the ages of
twenty-nine and thirty-nine. We allow for the possibility of preretirement
withdrawal of 401(k) assets when individuals experience employment
transitions. By combining data from the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) on the likelihood of cashing out a 401(k) account conditional on a
job change with data from other sources on the probability of job change,
it is possible to estimate the prospective preretirement “leakage” from
401(k) accounts. We conﬁrm that for households reaching retirement age
between 2024 and 2034, 401(k) balances are likely to be a much more im-
portant factor in ﬁnancial preparation for retirement than they are today.
We estimate that average 401(k) balances in 2024 will be between ﬁve and
tent imes the size they are today, and would represent 50 to 200 percent of
ar etiree’s Social Security wealth (depending on investment allocation and
based on current Social Security provisions). For persons retiring in 2034
we estimate that 401(k) balances will be 75 to 250 percent of their Social
Security wealth. Moreover, we ﬁnd that preretirement withdrawals have
a small eﬀecto nthe balance in 401(k) accounts. We estimate that these
withdrawals typically reduce average 401(k) assets at age sixty-ﬁve by
about 5 percent. This is largely because most households whose members
are eligible for lump-sum distributions when they change jobs choose to
keep their accumulated 401(k) assets in the retirement saving system.
These households either leave their assets in their previous employers’
401(k) plans, or they roll the assets over to another retirement saving ac-
count, such as a new 401(k) or an IRA. Most of those who do withdraw
assets have very small accumulated balances. By comparison, the expense
ratio charged by the ﬁnancial institutions administering 401(k) accounts
has a larger eﬀecto nr etirement resources than does the possibility of pre-
retirement withdrawal.
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tion in market returns over many years. To do this we made projections
based on random draws of returns from the empirical distribution of his-
torical returns. The results show that the median 401(k) balance at retire-
ment, especially when a substantial share of the 401(k) portfolio is invested
in equities, is below the mean. In the case of a 50–50 bond-stock portfolio,
fore xample, the mean 401(k) and rollover balance is $98,800, while the
median value is $94,600. The mean in this case lies between the 50th and
60th percentiles of the distribution. For the all-stock case, the mean is
between the 60th and 70th percentiles of the distribution of realized out-
comes. The most appropriate single measure is unclear. The results also
draw attention to the great diﬀerences between the bond and stock distri-
butions. Fore xample, 95 percent of bond returns are below $85,800, but
only slightly more than 20 percent of stock returns are below this level.
We plan further work in the future on random asset returns and the
growth of 401(k) balances. The results above, however, make clear the
wide variation in potential system-wide returns, especially stock market
returns.
Public Personal Accounts: Market Outcomes and Risk
In the past several years there has been a great deal of analysis of the
implications of Social Security reform, in particular of the incorporation
of personal retirement accounts into the Social Security system. Although
the vast recent literature on personal Social Security accounts makes virtu-
ally no reference to the rapidly expanding and overriding importance of
private personal accounts, both public and private accounts have many
features in common, including market risk. In “The Personal Security Ac-
count 2000 Plan, Market Outcomes, and Risk,” Sylvester J. Schieber and
John B. Shoven consider the market risk implications of the plan. They
conclude that an individual who chooses to invest personal accounts in
equities would run only a small risk of accruing beneﬁts lower than those
provided by the current Social Security system.
In early 1997, the 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security released
its ﬁnal report, which remarkably altered the nature of the debate in the
United States about the reform of our national retirement system. It did
so by giving legitimacy to recommendations that some element of Social
Security reform should include individual accounts held by workers. The
majority of the council’s members actually advocated such reform. To be
sure, there had been other people andg roups who previously had advo-
cated these types of Social Security reform in this country—but never
before had a group of individuals assembled under an oﬃcial charter by a
presidential administration come close to such a recommendation. Since
the council’s report was released there have been several serious proposals
put forward for reforming Social Security that include some element of
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proach to Social Security reform.
In their paper, Schieber and Shoven present a framework for assessing
Social Security reform proposals by evaluating a speciﬁc reform plan. This
plan is one derived from the original Personal Security Account (PSA)
developed by the 1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security (1997).
This plan has been dubbed PSA 2000 and its full elaboration is presented
in Schieber and Shoven (1999). In part, the PSA 2000 plan was developed
to respond to some of the criticisms of the original PSA plan.
The authors’ key ﬁnding is that the PSA 2000 plan allows risk-averse
individuals to retain beneﬁts at least as high as current-law beneﬁts. Those
who choose to take the risks inherent in stocks bear some chance of having
to live on lower than current-law beneﬁts in retirement. These risks are
modest, however, and the poor are signiﬁcantly protected by the presence
of the tier-one beneﬁts.
The authors describe a particular partial privatization plan that relies
more heavily on individual accounts than do most other proposals, and
evaluate its overall actuarial soundness and the outcomes that individuals
would face if it were adopted. The plan passes the actuarial soundness test
and would permit individuals to enjoy safe beneﬁts approximately equal
to current-law beneﬁts if U.S. government inﬂation-indexed bonds were
oﬀered and invested in. If participants invested their tier-two accounts in
common stocks, they would face a small probability of having signiﬁcantly
lessi nr etirement than current-law beneﬁts. However, these risks are re-
duced by the presence of the ﬂat tier-one beneﬁts. This ﬁrst tier is relatively
more important for low-income households, who would enjoy beneﬁts at
least as great as current beneﬁts with a high degree of certainty.
It is not surprising that the PSA 2000 plan performs well with respect to
the principles set out by the authors. The ﬁrst-tier deﬁned beneﬁts feature
provides an important safety net against poor investment returns and per-
mits the retention of the basic progressive structure of the current program
(Principle 1). A primary feature of the program is the mandatory contribu-
tion of 2.5 percent of covered payroll. Although these additional contribu-
tions would be partially oﬀsetb ythe actions of individuals, there would
beas i gniﬁcant net increase in national saving (Principle 2). The disability
and early survivor programs would be retained, and if the proportion of
the projected federal government surpluses suggested by President Clinton
were allocated to the program, there would be enough money to cover the
long-run deﬁcit of the disability program (Principle 3). Under all of the
scenarios examined, the PSA 2000 plan would be in balance or surplus
after seventy-ﬁve years and would oﬀer the prospects of payroll tax reduc-
tions (Principle 4). Most retiring couples would be treated as two single
individuals, thereby improving the equity between these participant classes
(Principle 5). The tier-two contributions and payouts would be directly
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by the 2.5 percent rebate in the form of a 1:1 match of tier-two contribu-
tions (Principle 6).
The authors examine the risks borne by individuals and judge them to
be tolerable. In particular, the amount of risk one would bear would be a
matter of personal choice. Furthermore, the risks are least for low-income
households (Principle 7). The PSA 2000 plan has relatively low adminis-
trative cost partly because it has relatively large (5 percent) individual ac-
counts (Principle 8). The authors do not advocate in this paper the particu-
lars of the PSA 2000 plan; they do, however, advocate that the riskiness of
all serious proposals be evaluated in a manner similar to the procedure
they follow in their paper. The authors emphasize that what is “hearten-
ing” about the ﬁndings is that a plan that relies heavily on individual ac-
counts can still be relatively safe for individual participants.
Annuitization and Retirement Beneﬁts
Mandatory annuitization is an important feature of the current Social
Security system and will pose an ever more important question with re-
spect to the increasingly common and likely future accumulation of large
private retirement accounts. In “Are the Elderly Really Over-Annuitized?
New Evidence on Life Insurance and Bequests,” Jeﬀrey R. Brownf ocuses
on this issue. He does so by considering whether individuals with bequest
motives purchase life insurance to oﬀset mandatory annuitization of So-
cial Security beneﬁts. He concludes that the answer is no, and that the
evidence is not suﬃcientt oa r gue against mandatory annuitization of cur-
rent Social Security beneﬁts.
It is well established in the economics literature that annuities ought to
beof substantial value to life-cycle consumers, who face an uncertain dates
of death. Buying a life insurance contract is analogous to selling an annu-
ity. It is generally viewed as an appropriate product for working-age indi-
viduals who seek to protect their families against the loss of future labor
earning. However, it appears to serve little purpose in the portfolio of a
retired life-cycle consumer who is concerned only with self-ﬁnancing re-
tirement out of accumulated wealth. With no labor earnings to insure, an
elderly individual should be purchasing annuities in order to provide a
certain consumption stream in retirement, not selling annuities through
the purchase of life insurance. Even if the individual wishes to leave a
portion of wealth to heirs in the form of gifts or bequests, this can be
achieved by investing this portion of wealth in ordinary bonds or other
nonannuitized assets. In fact, if life insurance premiums are higher than
actuarially fair, holding riskless bonds would strictly dominate life insur-
ance as a form of wealth transfer.
Yet elderly households in the United States overwhelmingly hold life
insurance, while only a small fraction hold privately purchased annuity
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(AHEAD) survey, which consists of households aged seventy and up, pri-
vately purchased annuity contracts (excluding private pensions) are held
by fewer than 8 percent of couples, while 78 percent of these couples own
a life insurance policy on at least one member. According to the Life In-
surance Ownership study (Life Insurance Market Research Association
[LIMRA] 1993), ownership of individual (nongroup) life insurance poli-
cies is actually higher among the age sixty-ﬁve and up group than any
other age cohort. Although this diﬀerence is oﬀset by much lower coverage
by group (usually employer-based) policies, the overall incidence of cover-
age among the elderly is quite high by any measure.
One suggestion is that life insurance is being held by elder households
to oﬀset an excessive level of mandated annuitization in the form of Social
Security. To the extent that this “annuity oﬀsetm odel” is true, it has at
least two important implications. First, it would be indicative of very
strong bequest motives, which constitute an issue of perennial controversy
in the economics literature. Second, if individuals are over-annuitized due
to these strong bequest motives, it would indicate a potential welfare gain
from lessening the extent of mandated annuitization.
This paper reexamines the annuity oﬀsetm odel using more recent and
better data than have previously been available. The paper presents sub-
stantial evidence that the reason the elderly hold life insurance is not to
oﬀset mandated annuitization in the form of Social Security in order to
leaveab equest. This ﬁnding is relevant to the current debate over the
future of the Social Security system because it bears upon the question
of whether mandatory annuitization is desirable. Were it the case that a
substantial fraction of elderly households were over-annuitized by the ex-
isting Social Security system due to the existence of strong bequest mo-
tives, it would be evidence in favor of allowing choice over the annuitiza-
tion decision. The results of this paper suggest that households are not
over-annuitized by Social Security for bequest reasons. Therefore, Brown
concludes, the simple fact that many elderly households own term life in-
surance is not a suﬃcienta r gument against mandatory annuitization of
retirement resources. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that annuities
areo fsubstantial value in the retirement portfolios of elderly individuals.
As a result, mandatory annuitization may be desirable to overcome ad-
verse selection in the annuity market. However, Brown emphasizes, this
conclusion should be tempered by the acknowledgment that individuals
may be over-annuitized for reasons other than bequest motives.
Wealth and Health
Ther elationship between wealth and health has received increasing at-
tention in recent years. A key issue has been the direction of causality:
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in this volume address this relationship, but from diﬀerent perspectives.
The ﬁrst focuses on the relationship between income and health; the sec-
ondf ocuses on the predictors of mortality.
Income and Health
Individuals for whom family income was less than $5,000 in 1980 could
expect to live about 25 percent fewer years than people whose family in-
come was greater than $50,000. This ﬁnding is explored by Angus Deaton
and Christina Paxson in their paper on “Mortality, Education, Income,
and Inequality among American Cohorts.” A key ﬁnding is that greater in-
come reduces the risk of death, even after controlling for education.
The strong relationship between mortality and socioeconomic status
(SES) has been a major concern in demography, epidemiology, and public
health for many years, and is beginning to attract the attention of econo-
mists. The concept of SES is used more widely outside the ﬁeld of econom-
ics than within it and one of the issues that remains to be settled is the
extent to which these diﬀerences are caused by income or by other factors
correlated with income (education being the most obvious). Many writers
believe that there is at least some direct protective eﬀecto fincome, and
in a recent body of literature much identiﬁed with the work of Richard
Wilkinson, it is argued that, while higher income is protective (at least at
the individual level), income inequality is a health hazard that raises mor-
tality, if not at the individual level at least in the general population or
larger subpopulations. Wilkinson postulates that inequality itself is a
health hazard and that it is less healthy both for rich and for poor to live
in a more unequal society. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the impor-
tance of such a link, if it indeed exists. The proponents of some changes
(e.g., improvement in school quality, or raising the return on Social Secu-
rity) make a plausible case that such changes will make everyone better
oﬀ, although some will be more so than others. If such changes increase
inequality, as almost certainly they would, the cost of lives lost would have
to be oﬀseta gainst the economic beneﬁts.
The authors’ main purpose in this paper is not to try to come to judg-
ment based on the review of the evidence, but to oﬀer some new evidence
based on income, income inequality, and mortality data for birth cohorts
of Americans observed over the two decades from 1975 to 1995. It seems
that birth cohort data—as opposed to individual data, state data, or coun-
try data—have not previously been used in this context; and unlike other
sources, birth cohorts oﬀer both a cross-sectional and a time series dimen-
sion to the same data. The model developed in the paper is designed as a
framework for empirical application, and provides a way of thinking about
the eﬀects of income and income inequality in a context in which, although
causality runs from income to health, it is not absolute income that matters
forh e alth but income relative to that average of an (unobservable) refer-
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that reference groups are not observed means that the slope of the ob-
served relationship between health and income varies with the ratio of
between- to within-group inequality. The model can be readily extended
readily to incorporate a direct eﬀecto finequality by making health de-
pend on the absolute size of income diﬀerences within the reference group;
bute q ually plausible speciﬁcations give diﬀerent results so that, according
to the theory, income inequality can be either protective or hazardous.
Deaton and Paxson give detailed consideration to the aggregation of the
relationship between health and income, and to how it can be expected to
change as it is examined with diﬀerent sources of data, such as individual
records, averages of states or countries, or averages of birth cohorts. The
authors document the strongly protective eﬀects of income and examine
how those eﬀects vary at diﬀerent points in the life cycle. As to inequality,
the authors fail to ﬁnd not only that it increases the risk of mortality, but
that there is actually a protective eﬀect, in apparent contradiction with not
only the Wilkinson hypothesis but with much of the theory developed in
this paper.
Deaton and Paxson also give a good deal of attention to the role of
education:w hether income is a mask for education, how income and edu-
cation aﬀectm o rtality in the cross-section and over time, and whether
the treatment of income and education aﬀects our results on the role of
inequality. In a cross-section of birth cohorts, income and education are
closely correlated so that, in order to disentangle their eﬀects, the authors
rely on the time series dimension of the cohort data, supplemented by
individual-level data from the National Longitudinal Mortality Study
(NLMS). The individual-level data show that both income and education
ares eparately protective against mortality and that only some of the eﬀect
of income is removed when we attemptt oallow for reverse causality from
nearing death to income. In the cohort data, by contrast, income appears
to increase the risk of mortality conditional on education, a result that
the authors tentatively ascribe to the short-run or business-cycle eﬀects of
income on mortality. In concluding, the authors emphasize:
Our original purpose was to use birth-cohort data to examine the links
between mortality and inequality. Controlling for income, we ﬁnd that
higher inequality is associated with lower mortality, a conclusion that
comes from negative association of mortality and inequality in the
United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While it is possible that
such a result has some real basis—and there are theoretical mechanisms
that could produce it—it is hardly established by these results. In partic-
ular, the sign of the eﬀecti si m plausible, if only because of the expected
operation of Jensen’s inequality, and the magnitude of the eﬀect isq u i te
sensitive to the way in which other variables are introduced, particularly
income and education. Indeed, we suspect that the current priority
should not be the investigation of the eﬀects of inequality, but the un-
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allow them to respond to income and education in diﬀerent ways. The
results reported here make it clear that this is no easy task; the way in
whiche ducation and income aﬀectm o rtality is not the same for men as
forwomen,norforyoungadultsasforolderadults;itisdiﬀerentoverlong
time periods and over the business cycle, and it is diﬀerent in the cross-
section from over time. We ﬁnd evidence that short-term increases of
income may raise the risk of mortality, particularly for young men. In
the cohort data, however, the longer-term eﬀects of income, or of income
linked to education, are protective. Yet this evidence needs to be rec-
onciled with the individual-level data from the follow-up studies, which
show that, especially for men, income plays a role as large as or larger
than that of education. Work on these issues has hardly begun (162).
Socioeconomic Status and Death Rates
In contrast to Deaton and Paxson, Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFad-
den, and Angela Merrill conclude in their paper on “Predictors of Mortal-
itya mong the Elderly” that their ﬁndings are consistent with the view that
the primary cause of the relationship between wealth and health is unob-
served individual characteristics that cause both early death on the one
hand and lower wealth and less education on the other.
The authors point out that diﬀerential mortality by (SES) has been ob-
served over a wide range of data on population, but because of data limita-
tions, the measures of SES have typically been occupation or education. In
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the AHEAD survey there is
scopef or expanded studies of diﬀerential mortality (the mortality gradi-
ent), because these panel surveys follow a large number of older persons
and obtain extensive data on income, wealth, and health conditions as well
as on occupation and education. Furthermore, the fact that the AHEAD
population is almost completely retired means that a very strong con-
founding eﬀecto fh e alth on income via work status is eliminated.
The goal of the paper is to study the predictors of mortality in the
AHEAD population. The authors focus on the mortality gradient as a
function of wealth. They emphasize that this gradient is important because
it causes diﬃculty in understanding life-cycle behavior from cross-
sectional variation in wealth: Besides cohort eﬀects that would, by them-
selves, cause wealth to decline with age in cross-section, the mortality gra-
dient will cause wealth to increase both in cross-section and in panel. As
ac ohorta ges, those with less wealth die, leaving survivors from the upper
part of the wealth distribution. Thus, even if no couple or single person
dissaved after retirement, the wealth of the cohort would increase with
age. This makes it diﬃcult to study life cycle wealth paths based on syn-
thetic cohorts, which will eliminate cohort diﬀerences in lifetime resources
but not diﬀerential mortality. These diﬃculties carry over to studies of
income and consumption in synthetic cohorts.
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of the subjective probability of survival. Respondents were asked to give
an estimate of their survival chances to a target age, which was approxi-
mately twelve years in the future. In the HRS this variable has been shown
to be as i gniﬁcant predictor of mortality between waves 1 and 2. A goal
of this paper is to determine whether it has similar predictive power over
the AHEAD population.
The authors conclude that the mortality gradient, whether a function of
wealth, income, or education, apparently decreases with age. The authors
say that any explanation at this point would be rather speculative, but the
ﬁnding is consistent with the view that the primary cause of the gradient
is unobserved individual characteristics that cause both bad health (and
therefore early death) and lower earnings (and therefore lower wealth and
lesse ducation). Were the causality to run primarily from economic re-
sources to health and mortality, the authors argue, we should see a persis-
tent diﬀerence in mortality outcomes in very old age between those with
substantial resources and those with few. The authors say they do not see
this, but they also say this should be conﬁrmed by further analysis. If
the diﬀerential is due to unobserved individual diﬀerences, the mortality
gradient operating at younger ages will have truncated the distribution, so
that in extreme old age the variation in individual characteristics would be
greatly reduced. Therefore, classifying people by SES would not produce
any substantial diﬀerences in mortality.
The subjective survival probability predicts actual mortality as in the
HRS, and the authors say this should increase our conﬁdence that it can
be used to construct individualized lifetables for models of life cycle saving
behavior as proposed by Hurd, McFadden, and Gan (1998). Whether such
lifetables will have substantial explanatory power for saving remains to be
determined as more waves of AHEAD become available.
Health Care
Threep apers consider diﬀerent aspects of health care in the United
States. Medicare spending in real terms has doubled in the past two de-
cades, even though the health of the older population has improved; two
papers aim to reconcile this apparent contradiction. A third paper devel-
opsamethod for understanding the reasons for the wide diﬀerences in
health care expenditures among ﬁrms in the United States.
End-of-Life Spending, Declining Mortality,
and Potential Health Care Saving
Lower mortality, and thus better health at a given age, might reduce the
cost of medical care; but this potential reduction can be oﬀsetb yincreas-
ing expenditure given health status. In their paper on “Trends in Medicare
Introduction 11Spending Near the End of Life,” Jeﬀrey Geppert and Mark McClellan
ﬁnd that increasing intensity of health care for both survivors and dece-
dents has far outweighed reductions in cost due to decreasing mortality—
and thus the continuing rise in health care expenditures.
Recent decades have witnessed dramatic improvements in health at
older ages, including reductions in both mortality and morbidity. Although
real growth in health care costs has accompanied improvements in health
for the past ﬁfty years, improvements in health give hope that avoided
medical utilization due to better health may lower health care costs, or at
least signiﬁcantly reduce the rate of growth. This might occur as a result of
mortality improvements, because decedents on average have much higher
health care costs than survivors, because average spending in the last year
of life declines with age, and because people are dying at older ages.
Spending in the last year of life accounts for nearly 30 percent of total
Medicare program payments, so a reduction in average spending per dece-
dent might signiﬁcantly inﬂuence total Medicare outlays. A similar argu-
ment applies to the decline in the prevalence of chronic disability. Elderly
patients with chronic disabilities cost more than the nondisabled elderly,
so reducing disability prevalence also holds the promise of lowering Medi-
care cost.
However, the importance of such program savings from the shift of ben-
eﬁciaries to lower-cost, more healthy states over time also depends on the
changes in expenditures, given health status, that occur at the same time.
Expenditures per capita are rising, and much evidence suggests that ris-
ing intensity of treatment is the principal cause. Changes in expenditures
given treatment may be responsible for some of the improvements in
health, and in any event changes in health and in expenditures will con-
tinuet oo c cur together. Despite these facts, prior studies generally have
notc onsidered both factors jointly, to determine whether the savings that
result from improving health over time are likely to have a quantitative
impact on expenditure growth. In this paper, Geppert and McClellan de-
termine the importance of changes in Medicare cost that resulted from
declines in age-speciﬁc mortality between 1988 and 1995, and calculate
how much Medicare expenditure trends would have diﬀered in the absence
of the mortality improvement.
The authors reach several conclusions. First, despite the fact that mor-
tality has continued to fall, the share of Medicare program payments ac-
counted for by persons in the last year of life has remained relatively con-
stant, declining only slightly over the past two decades.
Second, the rate of spending growth was similar for survivors and dece-
dents—actually, slightly larger for the oldest male survivors than for other
demographic groups—as a result of relatively greater growth in spending
forn o nacute services. Thus, spending growth for survivors continues to
account for most of the growth in Medicare cost.
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growth has changed in recent years. In the most recent decade, growth in
spending for nonacute services has accounted for half of overall spending
growth. Thus, spending growth for decedents was not primarily the result
of increasing the heroic, intensive measures near the end of life. In addi-
tion, although greater coverage of nonacute alternatives might be expected
to aﬀecte n d-of-life costs disproportionately, growth rates for nonacute ser-
vices were even greater for older survivors than for decedents. Large utili-
zation eﬀects for both acute and nonacute services occurred in both
groups.
Fourth, although improvements in mortality have beenafactor leading
to lower Medicare spending over time, this eﬀect has been swamped by
the much larger increases in expenditures given survival status for dece-
dents and survivors alike. Without the survival improvements, the authors’
estimates suggest that Medicare spending would have grown only 4 per-
cent more than it did.
Thus, the authors conclude that increasing utilization for both survivors
and decendents has been a far more important determinant of Medicare
spending over time than have improvements in mortality.
The Concentration of Medical Spending
In “The Concentration of Medical Spending: An Update,” David M.
Cutler and Ellen Meara conclude that the explanation for rising health
care cost in the face of declining disability is the increase in the use of
“postacute service,” in particularly home health care and skilled nursing
home care. That is, Cutler and Meara try to point to the speciﬁc factors
that have led to rising costs, given age, that Geppert and McClellan also
emphasize.
Cutler and Meara point out that during the last two decades, the num-
bero fM edicare beneﬁciaries has increased by 50 percent, and Medicare
spending per beneﬁciary has doubled in real terms. These ﬁndings are
diﬃcult to understand, however, in light of changes in the health of the
elderly. Disability rates are falling among the elderly by about 1.5 percent
pery ear. Since the disabled spend much more than the nondisabled on
medical care, it seems that in relative (if not absolute) terms, spending on
the elderly should be falling over time. The combination of large increases
in per-person spending and the reduction in disability leads to a paradoxi-
cals i tuation, in which policy analysts call simultaneously for reforms to
control Medicare cost growth (to bring spending for the elderly in line with
that for other age groups) and for Medicare to cover currently uncovered
services such as prescription drugs (to promote further health improve-
ments).
The goals of this paper are to document how trends in spending by age
have changed among elderly Medicare beneﬁciaries in the last decade, and
Introduction 13to reconcile the decline in disability rates with rapid increases in spending
among the elderly. In particular, the authors consider what has happened
to age-speciﬁc spending since 1987. The authors then attempt to reconcile
increased spending with sharply declining disability. In particular, these
relate medical spending by age to six factors: demographics, disability,
time until death, intensity of treatment, prices, and changes in the nature
of care.
Cutler and Meara reach two central conclusions. First, they ﬁnd that
the trend of disproportionate spending growth among the oldest old has
continued during the decade between 1985 and 1995. Between 1985 and
1995, spending for the younger elderly (ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine) rose
by 2p ercent annually in real, per-person terms, while spending for the
older elderly (ages eighty-ﬁve and up) rose by 4 percent. This is similar to
the diﬀerential increase in spending by age over the 1953–87 period, the
authors say.
Second, Cutler and Meara conclude that the reason for the large in-
crease in spending on the oldest elderly in comparison to the younger el-
derly is the rapid increase in use of postacute services—home health care
and skilled nursing care in particular—among the oldest old. People aged
eighty-ﬁve and older used, on average, $241 in postacute services in 1985
and $1,887 in 1995, a 20 percent annual increase. The younger elderly, in
contrast, increased their use of postacute services from $49 to $257, a 15
percent annual increase. Use of acute-care services, in contrast, grew rela-
tively evenly by age, 1.2 percent annually for the younger elderly and 0.7
percent annually for the older elderly.
The increase in the use of postacute service, the authors say, is the expla-
nation for the discrepancy between rising medical spending and falling
disability. Lower disability by itself contributes to lower spending than we
would otherwise observe; but the increase in use of nontraditional services
more than oﬀsets the eﬀects of improved health. The increase in postacute
serviceu se is also a major diﬀerence between the pre- and post-1987
trends. In earlier work these authors found that rising expenditures on the
older population were a result of increased intensity of acute-care services
for that age group. In the post-1987 period, intensity changes in acute-care
treatments do not account for a substantial discrepancy by age.
The authors suggest that increase in postacute service use may reﬂect
several factors: true increased service use for people who were not receiv-
ing care in the past; “gaming” of the Medicare system, whereby providers
nowu se out-of-hospital services instead of in-hospital services; or outright
fraud. They are unable to discriminate among these explanations, although
they suspect each is important.
The Reasons for Expenditure Diﬀerencesa mong Firms
Medical expenditure per employee varies enormously across ﬁrms in the
United States. In our paper on “The Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in Health
14 David A. WiseInsurancePlans:ADecompositionAnalysis,”MatthewEichner,MarkMc-
Clellan, and I develop a method to identify and quantify the importance of
the factors contributing to the wide diﬀerences across employer-provided
health plans. Our results suggest that further eﬀorts to understand the dif-
ferencesshouldfocusontherelativelyintensiveinpatientcare,andmustad-
dress both the variation in admission for intensive treatment and the vari-
ation in cost given treatment.
We aree ngaged in a long-term project to analyze the determinants of
cost diﬀerences across ﬁrms. In particular, we look forward to an estima-
tion that can predict the eﬀecto nm edical expenditures of speciﬁc changes
in medical insurance plan provisions. The project is based on insurance
claims records from a large number of employers. The vast amount of
information in insurance claims records is both a blessing and a curse. A
keya dvantageo fclaims data is the detail they provide, but the detail also
poses a challenge: how best to summarize and convey the information con-
tained in the millions of claims ﬁled each year under a typical employer-
provided plan.
Our goal in this paper is top r esent a method that allows us conveniently
to summarize information contained in the claims data. In particular, we
want to describe the sources of cost diﬀerences across plans. We consider
eight plans that vary in average expenditure for those ﬁling claims, from a
low of $1,645 to a high of $2,484. We then propose a method to decompose
these diﬀerences into their component parts. The goal is to quantify the
contribution of each component to total cost diﬀerences across ﬁrms. We
believe that this method allows us to point directly to the sources of cost
diﬀerence and thus will help us to focus subsequent analysis where it is
most likely to make a diﬀerence.
We ﬁrst present a statisticallyc onsistent method for decomposing the
cost diﬀerences across plans into component parts due to demographic
characteristics of plan participants, the mix of diagnoses for which partici-
pantsa re treated, and the cost of treatment given particular diagnoses.
The goal is to quantify the contribution of each component to the diﬀer-
ence between average cost and the cost in a given ﬁrm. The demographic
mix of plan enrollees accounts for wide diﬀerences in cost ($649). Perhaps
the most noticeable feature of the results is that, after adjusting for demo-
graphic mix, the diﬀerence in expenditures accounted for by the treatment
costs given diagnosis ($807) is almost as wide as the unadjusted range in
expenditures ($838). Diﬀerences in cost due to the various mixes of illness
that are treated, after adjusting for demographic mix, also accounts for
large diﬀerences in cost ($626). These components of cost do not move to-
gether; for example, demographic mix may decrease expenditure under a
particular plan, whereas the diagnosis mix may increase costs.
We also provide an approximate decomposition of the “variation” in
expenditures across ﬁrms. Although outpatient care accounts for almost
50 percent of expenditures on average, it accounts for only about 20 per-
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for about 34 percent of expenditures on average, but almost 59 percent of
the variation in expenditures. Thus, one can conclude that variations in
high-cost inpatient treatments are a principal cause of the substantial cost
variation across ﬁrms. (A “residual” group accounts for about 16 percent
of expenditure and about 20 percent of variation in expenditure across
ﬁrms.) The most important component of variation is the diagnosis rate,
which accounts for about 52 percent of variation across ﬁrms. Treatment
cost diﬀerences, given treatment, account for about 40 percent, with the
remainder accounted for by the interaction between the two.
Our results suggest that eﬀorts to understand the substantial diﬀerences
in private insurance expenditures should focus on the relatively intensive
inpatient care, and that further analysis should address the sources of vari-
ation in both admissions for intensive treatment (the diagnosis rate) and
the cost given treatment.
Social Security Provisions and Retirement
Twop apers consider the relationship between retirement and the provi-
sionso fs ocial security plans. The ﬁrst, based on German data, emphasizes
a method to estimate the eﬀecto fplan provisions when it is uncertain
under which of several programs a person could retire. The second paper
directs attention to Social Security retirement incentives in the United
States.
Uncertain Eligibility and Retirement in Germany
Analyses of the retirement incentive eﬀects of public and private pen-
sion plan provisions typically have assumed that the eligibility for a partic-
ular plan is known. In many countries, however, this is not the case. There
are often severalp a thways to retirement, with disability and unemploy-
ment insurance programs essentially serving as social security early retire-
ment programs. This the case in many European countries, for example.
In his paper on “Incentive Eﬀects of Social Security under an Uncertain
Disability Option,” Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan considers methods to estimate re-
tirement incentive eﬀects when the pathways available to an individual are
uncertain (to the analyst). He ﬁnds that an instrumental variable estimate
that uses expected incentive eﬀects in an option value retirement model
provides reliable estimates. His judgment is conﬁrmed in the discussion of
the paper by Daniel McFadden.
In most industrialized countries, old-age labor force participation de-
clined dramatically during the last decades. Together with population
aging, this puts the pay-as-you-go social security systems of the industrial-
ized countries under a double threat: Retirees receive pensions for more
yearsw hile there are fewer workers per retiree to shoulder the ﬁnancial
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tion has turned attention to the incentive eﬀecto fs ocial security systems:
Is a signiﬁcant part of the threat homemade because pension systems pro-
vide overly strong incentives to retire early? This “pull” view—that labor
supply has declined because early retirement provisions pull old workers
outo fem ployment—is in contrastto the“push” view—that asecularly de-
clining demand for labor has created unemployment, which pushes older
workers into early retirement.
The pull view is prominently advanced in a recent volume edited by
Gruber and Wise (1999). The authors from eleven countries argue that
the declining old-age labor force is strongly correlated with the incentives
created by generous early retirement provisions. Formal econometric anal-
yses (Stock and Wise 1990a for the United States; Meghir and Whitehouse
1997 for the United Kingdom; and Bo ¨rsch-Supan 1992, 2000 for Ger-
many) ﬁnd strong incentive eﬀects of public and private pension rules.
Incentive eﬀects of pension rules are usually estimated under the as-
sumption that the institutional environment provides a single pathway for
retirement age, or an opinion value of postponing retirement at any pro-
spective retirement age. However, most countries provide competing path-
ways that include several early-retirement options in addition to normal
retirement, typically at age sixty-ﬁve. In particular, this is true in Germany,
where early retirement due to a “disability” before ages ixty has been the
most common pathway to retirement.
Social Security Incentives for Retirement in the United States
In their paper on “Social Security Incentives for Retirement,” Courtney
Coile and Jonathan Gruber direct attention to the incentives for retirement
by considering the distribution of Social Security wealth accrual at diﬀer-
enta ges for participants in the HRS. Although Social Security beneﬁts are
intended to be actuarially fair between ages sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve, Coile
and Gruber show that there is enormous variation in accrual depending
on individual circumstances. For example, for about one-third of survey
participants, accrual is negative between ages sixty-two and sixty-three, so
that for these people there is a penalty on work at age sixty-two.
One of the most striking labor force phenomena of the second half of
the twentieth century has been the rapid decline in the laborf orce partic-
ipation rate of older men. In 1950, for example, 81 percent of sixty-two-
year-oldm en were in the labor force; by 1995, this ﬁgure had fallen to
51 percent.
Much has been written about the proximate causes of this trend, in
particular about the role of the Social Security program. A large number
of articles have documented pronounced spikes in retirement at ages sixty-
two and sixty-ﬁve, which correspond to the early and normal retirement
ages for Social Security, respectively. Although there are some other expla-
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under the Medicare program or rounding error in surveys, there is little
reason for a spike at sixty-two other than the Social Security program.
Indeed, this spike at age sixty-two emerged only after the early-retirement
eligibility age for men was introduced in 1961.
Thep r esence of these strong patterns in retirement data suggest that
Social Security is playing a critical role in determining retirement deci-
sions. In order to model the impact of Social Security reform on retirement
behavior, however, it is critical to understand what this role is. The evi-
dence of a spike at age sixty-two, for example, is consistent with at least
three alternative hypotheses. The ﬁrst is that there is an actuarial un-
fairness built into the system penalizing work past age sixty-two, so that
there is a “tax” eﬀect that leads workers to leave the labor force at that
age. Thes econdi sthat workers are liquidity constrained: They would like
to retire before ages ixty-two, but cannot because they are unable to bor-
row against their Social Security beneﬁts and have no other sources of re-
tirement support. In this case, there will be a large exit at age sixty-two as
beneﬁts ﬁrst become available. The third is that workers are myopic or in-
formation constrained: They either do not understand or do not appreci-
ate the actuarial incentives for additional work past age sixty-two, so they
retire as soon as beneﬁts become available.
The Coile-Gruber paper is an investigation of the tax eﬀect along four
dimensions. First, the authors assess whether the tax rate Diamond and
Gruber (1999) compute (using a synthetic individual with annual earnings
at the median of his cohort) is similar to the tax rate of the real median
person. We might expect a diﬀerence, as the shape of the earnings history
is a signiﬁcant determinant of Social Security incentives—through the
dropout years provision—and this is not appropriately reﬂected with a
synthetic earnings history. Second, the authors assess the distribution of
retirement incentives across the population. Even if there is no signiﬁcant
disincentive for the typical worker, disincentives for a large subset of work-
ers could still be associated with a spike in the aggregate retirement data.
Third, they assess the importance of considering incentives for retirement
in the next year versus incentives for retirement over all future years, draw-
ing on the insights of the option value model of Stock and Wise (1990a,b).
Finally, they incorporate the role of private pensions, an important deter-
minant of retirement for a large share of workers.
The strategy is to consider a set of real individuals, the older persons
surveyed in the HRS. These data allow the authors to compute carefully
the retirement incentives from Social Security and pensions, both for the
median individual and across all survey participants.
The authors conﬁrm that there is, in fact, a small subsidy to work at
ages sixty-two to sixty-four at the median. However, they also show that
there is substantial heterogeneity across persons. There is a net tax on
18 David A. Wiseworka ta ge sixty-two for about one-third of their sample, which is consis-
tent with a spike in the hazard rate at age sixty-two.
Bequests and Dissaving
Wealth accumulation before retirement and decumulation after retire-
ment have been the subjects of longstanding and intensive study by econ-
omists. In their study of “Anticipated and Actual Bequests,” Michael D.
Hurd and James P. Smith use new data from the HRS to deepen our un-
derstanding of the role of bequests in household decisions about these pro-
cesses.
Important advances have recently been made in documenting the pro-
cess of wealth accumulation by households. New data have increased our
knowledge about the facts surrounding the distribution of household
wealth and, to a lesser extent, household saving behavior. However, this
improved factual base has noty et been translated into a deeper under-
standing about the theoretical reasons people save. The candidates remain
much the same: life cycle timing, risk aversion, and bequests. Understand-
ing bequest motives has been particularly diﬃcult, in part due to the inher-
ent diﬃculties in measuring anticipated and actual bequests.
In their paper, Hurd and Smith study the role of inheritances and be-
quests in shaping household decisions about wealth accumulation. They
study bequests by using new methods of measuring anticipated and actual
bequests. They examine actual bequests made by deceased individuals and
compare them with their previously stated bequest intentions. Using panel
data with two measurements of subjective bequest probabilities, they ex-
plore the reasons an individual might revise his or her bequest expecta-
tions. Among other things, these reasons may include new information on
health or economic conditions of household members. Their results are
based on wealth, anticipated bequests, and actual bequests from two
wavese ach of the HRS and AHEAD. Because the paper uses two new
types of data, considerable attention is directed to validating these new
data.
Actual bequests are measured in exit interviews given by proxy respon-
dents for 774 AHEAD respondents who died between waves 1 and 2 of
the AHEAD survey. Among other things, these exit interviews provide
data about the medical and nonmedical costs associated with the illnesses
of the deceased respondents and the value and distribution of the estates.
Even though the deceased were quite ill before they died, medical expenses
did not cause substantial reduction in their estates. Because the exit inter-
view obtained estate information that is representative of the population,
the distribution of these estate values is quite diﬀerent than one would
suppose from estate records, which are obtained for only a wealthy subset
of the population.
Introduction 19Anticipated bequests were measured in two waves of HRS and AHEAD
by the subjective probability of leaving bequests. The authors study the
reasons for between-wave revisions of the subjective bequest probabilities.
They ﬁnd that increases in the subjective probability of surviving, incre-
ments in household wealth, and widowing were all associated with in-
creases in bequest probabilities, whereas out-of-pocket medical expenses
reduced the likelihood of a bequest. By comparing bequest probabilities
with baseline wealth, Hurd and Smith are able to test a main prediction
of the life cycle model: that individuals dissave at advanced old age. The
authors conclude that respondents anticipate substantial dissaving before
they die.
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